Housing Wire author Cary Steinberg recently wrote an interesting piece on about HAFA and HAMP. The premise of the article is that HAFA (the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative) will likely be successful because it is an exit strategy for homeowners, allowing them to sell their house for less than they owe – as opposed to HAMP (the Home Affordable Modification Program), which keeps people in their houses but modifies their payment terms to make payments less of a burden.
We have written plenty of articles here on HAFA and HAMP, and identified plenty of reasons why we think it won’t succeed, but it’s always interesting to revisit what is going on in the housing market, so let’s run through Cary’s article to point out some of what we consider flaws in the argument.
The first point that is made is that homeowners simply do not want to own a home where the balance of their mortgage exceeds the value of the property. In other words, they are underwater.
Say I bought my home in 2006 for $500,000 and put $50,000 down, and I got a loan for $450,000 at 7% for 30 years. I could afford the payment, and I paid on time. Fast forward to 2009. I am not making the bonuses I was in 2006, and my wife’s hours have been cut so our family income is not what it was. It seems that the HAMP program was made for me. Now comes the real question. Do I want to stay in the house? I owe essentially $450,000 on my home. From 2006 through 2009 the value of my home decreased from $500,000 to $240,000. I now owe $450,000 on an asset that is worth $240,000. Even if I were offered a mod to 3% and the term extended to 40 years do I really want continue to pay on a loan when the asset is worth about half of what I owe?
Granted that there are folks that didn’t buy their home as an investment but rather as a homestead. A place they felt they would stay for years to come. Maybe the schools are the best or the home is close to other family members, there are a variety of reasons. Those are the folks who have kept up their modifications through the trial period and into the permanent status. They may continue to pay, but as many areas are still seeing price stagnation and even continued decline, it will be interesting to note what the recidivism rate is on the permanent modifications in a couple of years. Some people started a trial modification because they initially hoped that things would get better and they would stay in the home. Some got on a trial modification simply to buy time. Some people stopped making their payments and it was months before they were offered a solution if they qualified for one.
My first concern he did address: some people buy homes and intend to live in them for a long time. There are plenty of homeowners who are underwater on their home who can afford and do continue to pay their mortgages. As a matter of fact, as of late last year that number was almost 1 in 4 homeowners. The argument that they should walk away has been made by others and is one I strongly disagree with in principle. The oft repeated argument we make here is that short sales when appropriate are a best case solution, but they aren’t always appropriate. Short sales are a lender’s decision to minimize an imminent loss.
Now, in the event of true hardship (which the article points out by reduction in salary), short sales can be a great solution. Maybe there is no reasonable mortgage modification that can be made that would enable a homeowner to still meet their obligations. In that event, a short sale is a great solution – however we have already identified numerous issues with the HAFA program itself that make it seem underwhelming at best. The negative feedback has been consistent. There are also numerous other reasons why the HAFA program was destined to fail, including:
- The underwhelming results of the overarching HAMP program. As a matter of fact, through January 2010, HAMP had only created a little over 100,000 modifications, despite having promises of reaching 4 million plus struggling homeowners. Remember, the HAMP program was also “mandatory“, but the results still were meager at best.
- Promises of speeding up the process seems a little bit “pie in the sky”. Even though the 10 day window does not describe the entire process, the loss mitigation departments at the banks are still struggling with being understaffed and overworked.
- There is no enforcement for not following the guidelines. There are no repercussions (other than consumer complaints) if things take 20, or 30 days, or if the terms aren’t followed as outlined.
- Financial incentives are low – $1000 incentive payouts aren’t really that much in the scheme of the amount of work involved to process one of these deals. 2nd lienholders in particular can get $3,000, but that’s only marginally more than they are getting today. Since lenders aren’t able to utilize deficiency judgments under HAFA, they also lose the ability to try and collect some of those outstanding amounts. This is important, because lenders often sell these for reduced values to other debt collection firms. Those are tangible assets for a bank that are essentially wiped out.
- Paperwork standardization – Banks are all using their own short sale packages today. Mix in some of these government HAFA files into the same loop and it’s going to get them even more confuse than they already are.
- Removing the case-by-case analysis that short sales need: Every short sale transaction is different, and lender should approach them as such. HAFA requires lenders to identify their minimum net proceeds ahead of time, and the guideline requires 120 day period to change that value. This means that if a property falls outside of the minimum net proceeds, it isn’t eligible under HAFA. That’s a shame; because the house is worth what the house is worth, and even in the span of 120 days the criteria used can change. It removes flexibility from the process, which is critical when handling these transactions.
Everything we have seen from users of Short Sale Artisan and in the market in general has indicated that HAFA is taking up a very small percentage of short sales that are going through, and the vast majority are still being handled as they were before HAFA went “live”. In the end the result will likely be an under performing program just like HAMP and HARP are.
The article continues to discuss the difficulty with the junior lien holder, which we have also discussed here.
Now, there are issues. Although HAFA provides for a little money to go to a junior lien if one exists, insiders are reporting that the juniors are not just rolling over and accepting what the plan calls for. This can delay a deal at best and kill a deal at worst. It is too early to tell what the success rate of the HAFA program will be but I am betting it will be far better than HAMP.
I personally would bet much different – I would say I think it will mirror HAMP in success, which is to say, negligible.
What do you think? Do you agree with the statement that:
HAMP is a band-aid. HAFA is an exit strategy.
We’d love to hear your comments!
